we not take seriously the needs of the entire biosphere, as well as our own perceived needs and those of other/future humans? How can we restore the earth, both materially and as a factor in our consciousness, perhaps reconceiving "needs" with sustainability in mind? What is the mindset that positions us as separate from, and even in a domineering, hostile relation with, the earth? Why do we not perceive nature as alive, as many of our ancestors did (Sheldrake, 1994; Suzman, 2021)? What are the psychological costs of the currently dominant conception of development and of our present relation to the earth? How can "development" be made realistically compatible with sustainability? Can we reimagine what development means in a way that explicitly includes developing and sustaining a mode of consciousness incorporating and serving the entire biosphere (Plotkin, 2006; Losurdo, 2014). What is it in the background of contemporary consciousness that makes that so difficult? Perhaps the most interesting and crucial question is, will sustainability require that a change in awareness come first, or will real steps toward sustainability gradually change our awareness as we seek sustainability? (Riggs & Hellyer-Riggs, 2019). In sum, what IS the problem? And how can we define and escape the level of consciousness within which the problem has arisen?

CURRENT SITUATION/MINDSET

It seems clear to us that the desperate need for a new mindset, a new cognitive paradigm for understanding ourselves as inhabitants of the finite world, and an updated phenomenology of our actual experience, has become even more obvious. The intensification of climate change—2021 was yet another hottest-year-ever—also intensifies the imperative for fundamental change. More immediate in its impact and implications, and probably connected directly with climate change and other forms of unsustainable damage to natural systems, is the Covid-19 pandemic. As we write, devastating drought and catastrophic flooding haunt much of the earth. Enormous fires destroy forests and pour carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. It is long past time to get beyond what Suzman (2021) called the "breezy rhetoric of sustainability."

It is ever more undeniable that human activity which disrupts and damages ecosystems also damages the entire biosphere, and that the biosphere is us (Rich, 2021). Human decisions and actions cannot affect "nature" without affecting us. We do not exist outside and in opposition to "nature." Making use of other elements of nature, in any form, for narrowly conceived human "needs"—wet markets selling wild animals for meat, clearing rainforest for beef production, burning fossil fuels to power industrialization—is symptomatic, but symptomatic of what, exactly? We must recognize that the fate of future people cannot be thought about or pursued only by reference to narrow human needs and wants as currently defined. The epistemologically convenient and powerful, but ultimately disastrous, separation of the human from the natural is suicidal. Human needs are inextricably entangled in the viability of biospheric processes.

It is clear to us that these destructive acts and processes are symptomatic of a

pathological and no-longer-sustainable—it never actually was sustainable--mindset. We must, cognitively, some would say "spiritually," inhabit a new level of consciousness in order to inhabit the earth sustainably. We must redress our delusional attempt to secede from the biosphere. We are animals (Wolfe, 2012, 2020). Honest consideration, phenomenological analysis, of our current experience is crucial to defining a new way of understanding sustainability. Has the suspension of some of our aggressive exploitation and profit-seeking imposed by Covid-19 permitted many to recognize what has been lost? Could honest appreciation--phenomenological contemplation—of our experience of reduced pollution; less consumption; and more conscious, even leisurely, contact with our environment make us more aware of the costs, the loss, entailed by our unsustainable practices and the mindset that makes them seem unavoidable, or even desirable? Phenomenology asks what is our current experience actually like? Are we experiencing, all at once, the pleasure to be derived from nature, the inadequacy of the current paradigm to serve and protect us, the consequences of invading and dismantling natural systems, and the crushing human costs of social inequality? Are moral, psychological, and material sustainability inextricably linked? Are they not even really distinguishable?

HEALTH BENEFITS OF CONTACT WITH NATURE
There is a considerable and growing body of research arguing persuasively that direct experience of, phenomenological immersion in, nature can contribute to better health and a change in mindset. Berman, Jonides, & Kaplan (2008) documented the cognitive benefits of close interaction with nature. Donovan, Butry, Michael, Prestemon, Liebhold, Gatziolis, & Mao (2013) showed that contact with trees has positive health effects in humans. As demonstrated by Hanson, Matt, Bowyer, Bratkovich, Fernholz, owe, Groot, & Pepke (2016), even in urban settings, experience of forests enhances both individual and social health. Paul (2021) argued that intelligence itself, far from residing exclusively in the "mind," or even the brain, is a function of relations among the body and the aspects of environments. Clearly, human "needs" should be defined as including direct, bodily experience of nature. Arvay's (2018) work has illuminated the positive effects of what Wilson (1984) originally termed the "biophilia effect." It is evident, not only that we humans need to experience our love of nature and our sense of loss at being alienated from it, but also that immersion in nature can foster a mindset that favors sustainability. Given the voluminous research showing that "mind" is a bodily function, the current emphasis on "mindfulness" can be understood as recommending awareness of one's bodily presence in particular, phenomenologically specific, moments and places (Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2006). With those moments of bodily presence in natural places, healing and movement toward sustainable cognition can occur.

According to the World Economic Forum (2021), students who spend just 10 minutes a day in nature could reduce stress. Overall, the review found that compared with equal time spent in an urban setting, walking in a range of natural settings led to significant health

improvements. These included reduced heart rate, blood pressure, and cortisol, improved mood and reduced anxiety. Students might want to incorporate nature exposure into their daily lives as a way of combating stress and improving mental health (www.weforum.org).

ORIGINS OF THE MINDSET

Western philosophy, and, at least since the seventeenth century, modern science, have been heavily invested in separating mind from body and humanity from nature. (Sartwell, 2021). Even before the seventeenth century, Aristotelian science was being criticized for being too "passive" in its attitude toward nature, for perceiving nature as alive (Berman, 1981). It has often been argued that the manipulation of nature for human ends, and the beginning of unsustainable culture, began with systematic agriculture (Suzman, 2021). However, there is no doubt that the ambition, and the capacity, to alter nature in major ways arose in earnest in Europe in the seventeenth century.

By separating mind from body, and associating the body with nature, modern epistemology, and the cognitive style it depended on and fostered, made dominance and manipulation of nature the test of knowledge. It seems as if modern science was born out of fear of nature, and out of determination to subjugate and exploit it. It is a fascinating and frustrating paradox that modern science, whose warnings of environmental catastrophe are now being widely ignored or angrily rejected, arose to fulfill the desire to conceive the world as a servant of human desire and ambition. Climate science is demolishing delusions that were first those of modern science, itself. It is the promise and ambition of early modern science—the alliance of scientific knowledge and technological power-- that has turned out to be unsustainable. The vision of what Crutzen & Schwägerl (2011) termed the "Anthropocene" has turned out to be dystopic, not the paradise of human appropriation of nature for human-defined purposes imagined by seventeenth-century epistemology and its associated mode of cognition (Paul 2021).

The current "debate," and of course the term gives much too much credit to one side, about climate change provides an interesting, and desperate, occasion for reexamining the origins of modern science and its dominant style of cognition. The basis of modern epistemology—of what eco-feminist Plumwood (1993) called the "master model," and what has been called even more evocatively, "conquistador cognition" (Riggs, 1999)-- is that nature is simultaneously nothing but dead space and matter, available for exploitation in the service of human projects, and somehow also a fearsome witch who must be subdued, dominated, and made to serve the purposes of culture ((Bacon, 1620, as cited in Rifkin, 2004). The arrogant dream of replacing the "female" biological world with one conceived and built by a process of masculine manufacture, using materials drawn from nature and dumping the effluent of the manufacturing process into the "dead extension" of the physical world, is our nightmare, today. As Virilio (1989) argued, natural perception itself has been replaced in modernity by increasingly mediated perception. We are totally dependent on the same physical world—and body—that we pretend to transcend and

manipulate.

OUR PEDAGOGY IN TWO COURSES

Some work on the theory and practice of pedagogy for transformative/engaged learning, contemplative learning, and critical thinking combines very well with our recent concentration on sustainability (Riggs & Hellyer-Riggs 2010, 2011, 2014). Pedagogical strategies we have developed for specific courses can profitably be adapted to teaching for awareness of issues related to sustainability. One of the basic concepts in transformative learning is the activating event: a challenge to conventional thinking and perception deep enough to motivate significant change. Sustainability is a question of values, of styles of cognition, and even of emotion, before it can be a matter for science. What do we want to sustain? What have we lost by being alienated from nature? What has been in the way of sustainable consciousness and behavior? This is where education comes in.

A course on modernizing Europe and colonial/post-colonial Nigeria provided a number of excellent opportunities to make sustainability a theme, and to encourage critical thought about the origins and development of our crisis of sustainability. This course was a re-reading and re-thinking of the history of events and processes that we have always been taught to admire. Today, college students are sufficiently aware of crises that threaten their future to be receptive to critical thinking about "our" history. Making the issue of sustainability, or unsustainability, a central theme of the course provided a strongly constructive focus for their unease.

The course began with consideration of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a watershed in the accelerating modernization of Europe. The voyages of "discovery," motivated by the desire for new material wealth, inaugurated the steadily intensifying competition among some European states that we call "imperialism/colonialism." In the course, we recognized the "discovery" of the Americas as an early, and completely missed, opportunity to learn from "traditional" societies and cultures (Diamond, 2012). The relationship between Native American peoples and their natural environment could have served as a model for Europe and the modern West. Contact between European imperialists and colonialists and "native" peoples had always been central to the course; now, sustainability provided a unique urgency to recognizing what might have been learned from people and cultures devastated, even exterminated, by "modern" people. Instead of contemplating the ways in which Native Americans inhabited their environment and husbanded their resources, the invaders dehumanized them so as to be able to treat native people themselves as resources serviceable for European purposes.

A crucial element in our reconsideration of modernization was the issue of property. It is understandable that eighteenth-century reformers, in a time when property ownership was largely monopolized by kings and aristocrats, saw in property ownership a key to liberation. However, as Losurdo (2014) and many others have pointed out, John Locke, for example, conceived of property ownership as requiring that "waste"—natural—land be

"improved." Native Americans were seen as having no entitlement to their lands because they did nothing to "improve" them (Losurdo, 2014). This disastrous conception of property rights persists in our concept of "development." People who do not exploit their natural resources intensively enough, by modern standards, are "under-developed," or, indicating that development is regarded as both desirable and inevitable, "developing."

We have, in the introductory part of this paper, mentioned the origin of modern science's instrumental power in the separation of mind from body, and of "man" from nature. The ideal of power over nature is discernible in both Baconian science and Lockean property: transforming given nature in service to human projects was being fully "human" (Solomon, 1998; Losurdo, 2014) Consideration of scientific inquiry as motivated by the ambition to "improve" the material conditions of life—again understandable under conditions prevailing in eighteenth-century Europe—led us to reconsideration of the Enlightenment. While seeing in the Enlightenment emphasis on evidence-based knowledge and independent thinking a precursor of what we try to do in this course, we also recognized that Enlightenment thinkers failed to discredit slavery and endorsed the crudely instrumentalist view of the natural world.

The Enlightenment period also saw the beginning of the industrial revolution, and Adam Smith's formulation of *laissez faire* capitalist ideology. Non-white people were routinely regarded as less than fully human, and therefore as available to be exploited for purposes conceived by Europeans and other whites. Slavery was at its height—or depth. The wealth of nations was defined in terms of productivity and commerce, and new machines were powered by the burning of coal. When assessing the "positives" and "negatives" of industrialization, students were asked to see the process as having led to the crises we face today. We read some of Thomas Malthus's *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, and students were asked to decide whether or not Malthus was correct to regard resources as finite, and exponential population growth as eventually disastrous (Malthus, 1998). This issue is complicated, of course, by Malthus's contention that the poor are inherently defective, and that aid to them is both futile and immoral. Discussion of Malthus led us to consider the distribution of costs and benefits of social and economic change. How will the costs and benefits of movement toward sustainability be distributed? Who is most responsible for today's crises, and who will suffer most from them?

At this point in the course, an online discussion forum—a crucial element of our transformative pedagogy—asked students to respond to a prompt, and then to reply to another student's initial response. Among the prompts were the following. In what ways is Malthus correct, and what criteria do you apply in making this judgment? Can the Enlightenment ideal of independent thought be applied to criticism of some Enlightenment ideas? Do the current environmental crises mandate a reconsideration of what we have understood as "progress"? These questions obliged students to develop criteria of judgment and to look at issues from multiple perspectives.

The next major focus of this course was Social Darwinism and European imperialism

and colonialism in Africa, and particularly in Nigeria. Students are usually well prepared to recognize the injustice of regarding some humans as inherently superiority to others as a way of justifying oppression and exploitation. However, making sustainability a theme of the course obliged us to look critically, not only at the assertions of superiority, but at the definition of "progress" in terms of powerful technologies and their use in exploiting nature and people. It is obvious enough that documents like Kipling's "White Man's Burden" (in Change and Tradition, 2010) exemplify a racist hierarchization of "types" of humanity and anticipate the genocidal horrors of the twentieth century. However, thinking in terms of our crises of sustainability, and of the mindset and practices that produced them, led us to recognize the wealth of cultural wisdom that was destroyed by colonialism.

Like the European invaders of the Americas, and like the permanent colonists who followed them, imperialists in Africa were so convinced of their superiority, and so driven by the greed that was disguised by claims of superiority and by the "civilizing mission," that they never imagined learning anything from traditional African societies. The savagery of forced labor and calculated removal or eradication of peoples are obvious and horrifying. However, we also now focused on the systematic, often violent, replacement of locally adapted subsistence agriculture by large-scale, monocultural cash-cropping for export. How much knowledge and wisdom about sustainable relations with specific environments were lost by remaking much of Africa into another reservoir of resources to be exploited for European purposes?

Despite the official end of colonialism in 1960, Nigeria, today, still has a colonial-style economy: the country is dependent on the extraction of petroleum for consumption by foreigners; the oil industry has ruined the Niger River delta and the sustainable local economies that used to thrive there; once self-sufficient agricultural communities are now dependent on imported food that must be bought on the international market with the volatile earnings from oil exports. Famine and pervasive poverty are endemic in today's Nigeria. In another discussion forum, students were asked to reflect on what the material we had looked at had taught them about the ideas and practices that have led to the crisis of sustainability and what resources—cognitive, practical, and emotional—we can bring to bear on the search for a more sustainable relation with the earth. Can our fear of and flight from the specter of scarcity be replaced by the confidence, exemplified by our forager ancestors, that the earth can and will supply what we really need (Suzman, 2021)? Do our mode of cognition and our ruthless exploitation and despoliation of nature actually *produce* the scarcity that we fear? Is our obsessive focus on what Suzman (2021) calls the "economic problem"—the allocation of allegedly scarce material resources—a major ideological/cognitive reason for the difficulty we still have in trying to confront the crisis of sustainability?

Perception was the focus of an excellent article by Jessica Belue Buckley (2013). She outlined a phenomenological approach to restoring a mindful, sustainable relationship with nature. Living sustainably implies a certain way of perceiving the earth and our relation

to it. Such perception leads to concrete choices informed by that perception (Buckley, 2013). Buckley began by analyzing some elements of our current language that imply the lack of such a relationship. She pointed out, for example, that we speak of throwing trash "out" or "away." This clearly suggests that the trash will no longer be connected to us in a place that we inhabit, that it will be consigned to an abstract non-place. Mindful contemplation of reality would recognize that there is no such abstract space that is separate from us and immune to being damaged by us. The concept of the circular economy seems to represent a move toward theorizing a sustainable economic paradigm (Sustainable Management School Switzerland Business School, 2019).

A psychology course about Child Development taught at a large campus with abundant greenspace seemed a perfect place to teach the importance of mindfulness of nature to be passed on to the next generation. Mindfulness is the mental state achieved by focusing one's awareness on the present moment, while calmly acknowledging and accepting one's feelings, thoughts, and bodily sensations. Students in this class were asked to focus on what they were aware of while walking through the greenspace to class. Several students commented they were mindful of the squirrels gathering food for the winter, the stream going through the middle of campus, the different bird species, and the fresh scent of the newly mowed lawn. Other students had difficulty thinking of anything other than the song that was playing on their earbuds, or of talking or texting to friends on their cellphones.

Throughout the semester, many of the class sessions were conducted outside. We beganS class by talking about what we saw and heard until most students became more aware of the beauty of the natural environment. The goal was to help students become mindful of nature and the precarious condition of our environment. Students thought of ways in which they could be activists for sustainability on campus. Creating an activating event enabled students to see that there is much work that needed to be done in our own campus culture to improve and sustain the greenspace. We discussed ways in which sustainability could be incorporated into the psychological theories we were studying, including the phenomenological theory.

Buckley's (2013) phenomenological account reminds us of our own actual experiences of connectedness with nature. Mushroom hunting in the woods, hiking and fishing in the mountains, lying at night under the stars in places far from urban light pollution, cultivating and harvesting vegetables and other crops for home consumption, all are potential models for an intense experience of our embeddedness in the earth. One author lived as a child on three acres where most of what was eaten was grown or raised, organic waste was composted, and all family members contributed labor. We now realize that this was much closer to sustainability than what we have achieved, now, in suburbia. We can be intensely mindful of our earth-embeddedness as we watch the birdlife and trees in our yard and walk around our neighborhood ponds and the nearby lake. Close attentiveness reveals an amazing wealth of wildlife and plant life even here, in the suburbs. How would we find

our way back to an overall practically sustainable life? How can keeping nature in mind lead to living sustainably in/on the earth? We buy organic food whenever possible; we shop at the local farmers' market; we eat mostly plant-based food; we exercise outdoors, trying to be mindful of our bodies in interaction with the earth; we use LED light bulbs and energy-efficient household appliances; we use reusable grocery bags, and we have installed energy-saving insulation and windows in our house. We have only battery-powered yard equipment, and we have joined a coalition of citizens and business/community groups that promotes the greening of our city. We do not pretend that these choices have made our lifestyle fully sustainable, but they are all small moves toward that goal, and they are also exercises of mindfulness that contribute to a change in our overall awareness. Taking such measures has changed our way of thinking, motivating us to make further choices and to redefine our needs with those of all of humanity and of the earth in mind. The phenomenology of our way of inhabiting the earth is changing.

CONCLUSION

The current situation, which is beyond urgent; our students' huge stake in the future; our own experiences; and our work in pedagogy for transformative learning and critical thinking make sustainability a powerful new explicit focus for our courses. Sustainability as a central theme of the courses, along with incorporating concrete experiences of nature, is now at the heart of our pedagogy.

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The De-privatization of Religious Populism: A Look at the Contemporary Phenomena of Modernophobia and Islamophobia

Jorge Botelho Moniz, Lusófona University, Associate Professor and Director of the B.A. in European Studies and International Relations

ABSTRACT

This work investigates the origins of religious populism, examining it vis-à-vis the advent of secularism and the idea of the privatization of religion. Through a descriptive and analytical methodology, this paper will examine how, contrary to the theories of secularization, the de-privatization of religion has occurred and how, consequently, the politicization of this discourse has deepened. It is with the development and deepening of the politicization of religion that religious populism starts to penetrate and gain preponderance in the public space, assuming a gradually more relevant influence in the current political discourse and in the understanding that individuals make of themselves and of others. This research focuses geographically on the West (Europe and North America) and Islam (Middle East and North Africa) since this regional dichotomy allows us to isolate two subtypes of religious populism – modernophobia and Islamophobia – close to right-wing populism and to its ideas of culture and identity. We conclude that these types of religious populism derive from the de-privatization of religion, thus promoting a (negative) reaction to modernization, namely in the form of anti-secularism, and a deepening of populist-religious discourses and practices, respectively.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of religious populism, i.e., the idea of a subtype of populism employed to the religious sphere is, as explained elsewhere (Brissos-Lino 2021: 31ff), an innovative, complex, and multidimensional notion. Indeed, it encompasses a religious dimension *stricto sensu* – exclusionary moralism, intervention in the name of God, and religious leaders based on personal charisma – and religious-political one – narrative against elites, nativism against globalization, and anti-environmentalism.

The sophistication and innovative character of this concept is reflected in the lack of discussion regarding the links between populism and religion. With a few exceptions (Brissos-Lino 2021; Moniz 2021; Apahideanu 2014), most works inconsistently use the term *religious populism* to show the politicization of the discourse of churches and religious communities (Stavrakakis 2002), to describe radical or reactionary religious movements (Yates 2007), or as a form of political Islam (Hadiz 2016).

However, as demonstrated elsewhere (Moniz 2021: 61ff), the relationship between religion and populism must be primarily understood as a broad and complex historical process vis-à-vis the interactions between religion and politics that have taken shape through two supposedly dichotomous currents in modern states: secularism and religious

revivalism.

This paper will seek to establish this bridge, systematizing these concepts in articulation with the phenomena of modernophobia (Moniz 2021: 85ff) and Islamophobia (Moniz 2021: 89ff). Thus, through a new exploratory and descriptive methodology, it will seek to understand how religious populism has been de-privatized in the West – the North Atlantic world – and what shapes and forms it has gained in these societies.

POLITICAL DE-PRIVATIZATION OF RELIGION

In scientific considerations about the place and future of religion in the modern world, secularization was the dominant paradigm between the post-World War II period and the 1960s (Moniz 2017: 76-81). The argument that the process of modernization, including its subprocesses – rationalization, societalization, functional differentiation, or existential security – is incompatible with religion and leads to its continuous loss of social significance has had resonance in Western, especially European, societies.

Consequently, secularism was a trend in world politics until the mid-1960s (Shah & Toft 2009: 134). However, it is better understood as the result of social negotiations and political struggles, i.e., as a non-teleological historical development that produces side effects, resistances, and countertrends, including the return and de-privatization of religion (Casanova 1994). The connection between the development of secular faith and the loss of religion, the inability of secular movements and doctrines to answer practical and metaphysical questions (the *crisis of modernity*), the collapse of the ideological imaginary of the Cold War, and the mutations produced during globalization, have led in the last two decades to the return of religion which takes a variety of different forms: Islamic fundamentalism, Evangelical churches, or *new age* movements.

In opposition to the expectations of the *grand narrative* of secularization, which assumed the disappearance of religion as a political and social authority – a universal, univocal, unilinear movement –, religious communities have become stronger and more prominent in most states over the past few decades. The motto *God is dead*, asserted more than a century ago by Nietzsche, has more recently been accompanied by the idea of God's revenge (Kepel, 1991). According to Kepel (1991) or Huntigton (1996), religion resurfaces as a mechanism that gives meaning to peoples' lives in the face of the crisis of modernity. It is claimed that religion has overcome both Marxist historicism, positivist scientism and the different philosophical theories that declared its downfall. Moreover, it has come to occupy the place left by science and technology in the face of the impossibility of responding to the existential needs of individuals. In fact, many authors now defend the centrality, prosperity, ferocity, or even the dramatic worldwide return of the religious phenomenon.

In general, this perspective coincides with some of the fundamental events for the return of religion, especially, since the last quarter of the 20th century (Kepel 1991; Huntington 1996; Berman, Bhargava & Laliberté 2013). These phenomena show how all over the world religious traditions begun, sometimes even violently, to leave the private

sphere and enter public life triggering the de-privatization of religion in public space. According to Casanova (1994: 5), this de-privatization, which began especially during the 1980s, means that religious traditions refuse to accept the marginalized and privatized role that theories of secularization and modernization had reserved for them. In resisting the processes of secularity and modernity, religions continue to operate in the public sphere and have political impact in modern societies. Symptomatic is the proliferation of the sacred and its growth, even under conditions of intense modernization.

No longer limited only to the pastoral care, religious institutions begin to challenge the dominant social and political forces more, questioning their neutrality and furthering the traditional links between public and private morality. Casanova (1994) emphasizes, in this context, four Catholic and Protestant countries – Spain and Poland, Brazil and the US – and how they, as well as Islamic fundamentalism, have challenged postwar secular expectations and even, going back further in the past, the principles of the Enlightenment.

The increasing role of religion in modern societies around the world is also related to the expansion of the concept of freedom and the third wave of democratization (mid-1970s and early 1990s) and, consequently, to how individuals have become able to influence the construction of the public life of their societies (Shah & Toft 2009: 134).

As they begin to exercise their new political freedoms, a new pattern emerges: the negative reaction to the secular restrictions imposed by the first generation of post-independence *modern* leaders. This is the case, for example, in Atatürk's Turkey, Nehru's India, or Nasser's Egypt. Similarly, in the late 1990s, as liberalization advanced in different countries such as India, Mexico, Nigeria, Turkey, and Indonesia or in Latin America, especially in Brazil, Guatemala and Nicaragua, the influence of religion in political life "increased dramatically" (Shah & Toft 2009: 134). Even in the US, evangelical Protestants have begun to exert a greater influence on the Republican Party. In general, wherever the world political systems reflected people's values, they would almost inevitably tend to reflect people's religious beliefs as well.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, or the digital mass media there was a feeling that "a new era had begun, the era of globalization" (Juergensmeyer 2017: 335). In this period, some analysts thought that this meant that the West had won the fight and that ideological conflicts, such as the clash between socialism and capitalism, were a thing of the past. According to Fukuyama (1992), in the early 1990s, the world was witnessing *the end of history*. However, what was really happening was the end of one type of global ideological confrontation and the beginning of another, linked to secularism and religion. This new ideological confrontation was a response to modernization and globalization.

The 21st century would deepen this conflict. The terrorist attacks of September 11 had profound political, social, cultural, and moral impacts, both immediate and mediate. One major effect was a renewed awareness of the place of religion in public space. This has shaped global modernity and helped transform the nature of religious beliefs and practices.

A "crucial change" (Yates 2007: 127), as will be seen below, was the resurgence of a publicly active religious populism.

DE-PRIVATIZATION OF RELIGIOUS POPULISM

As Yabanci & Taleski (2017: 283) wrote, the relationship between religion and populism "does not bode well at first sight." Their argument is that the universal and sacred assumptions of religion are antagonistic to the mundanity of populism – understood as a "lesser form" of politics (Zúquete 2017: 10). Nevertheless, the relationship between populism and religion is evident.

Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a resurgence of religious populism around the world. In the US and later in Europe, populist religious movements have strengthened in various spheres of public life. Religious issues have become increasingly relevant in national and international politics (Moniz 2019: 16ff).

Beyond the US and Europe, religious populism has spread even more powerfully in the Middle East, with the rise of the religious zeal of radical Islam and the renewal and impact of jihadism. In the region, despite secularism, the political sphere encompassed religious issues. This helped promote the growth of Arab nationalist movements – a secular system opposed to Western colonialism and interventions – and conservative and radical religious movements.

In parallel with Arab nationalism, religious groups were strengthened thanks to the contradictions of the nationalist regimes established in these countries. These groups consolidated themselves as an alternative to the power vacuum in the poorest regions of the Middle East. Consequently, they sought to revitalize and/or reformulate Islam, proposing the Islamization of modernity and adopting the model of the Islamic State from the time of the caliphate. In this context, since the second half of the 20th century, the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State have reemerged.

That said – and considering many other examples from other regions, notably Latin America (Shah & Toft 2009: 134ff), which are, however, of less interest in the context of this paper –, as (Yates 2007:127) puts it, the forces of religious populism "appear everywhere to be on the move", showing a great appetite for public and political confrontation "in the name of God". Despite the differences, all forms of populism share an anti-system attitude whose rhetorical appeal focuses on the consciousness and concerns of the people. In the case of religious populism, this appeal usually emphasizes the closeness of each believer to divine authority. The nature of this proximity creates great pressure and demand for the pursuit of personal and social justice. In short, while praising popular religious belief and practice, religious populism also calls the laity to reformative action in the world.

However, it should be stated that religious populism is not a new phenomenon in modern history. According to Mabille (2019: 4), the "first articulation" of populism with religion occurs through the rapprochement of a certain "reactionary rhetoric, in the proper sense of the word, [to religion], that is, a political will that opposes to change and longs

for a return to a previous situation, whether real or imaginary". But also, it derives from its approach to cultural developments often presented as associated with minority rights.

As Zúquete (2017: 446ff) explains, the first example of religious populism links simultaneously to the first populist movement in the US – the People's Party of the 1890s. Protestant evangelicalism was the main reference through which this populist wave – composed fundamentally of some of the poor and excluded classes of industrialization, such as farmers and workers in the Southern and Western states – analyzed and interpreted the major economic and political issues of its time. Its main objective was to revive the lost link to inalienable rights, freedoms and values that were allegedly under attack by elites responsible for building an unjust, oppressive, and amoral society. According to Creech (2006: xviii-xix *apud* **Zúquete** 2017: 447), the religious ideals of these group shaped the way populists understood themselves and their movement. That is, they began to operate within a cosmic, prophetic, and apocalyptic narrative, typical of the Christian revival, of permanent conflict between the power of God and democracy *versus* the devil and tyranny which would serve as an ideological reference for the pursuit of political and economic reforms. It is in the context of this revival, with the development of religious movements such as the Mormons, Adventists, or Assemblies of God and with their proximity to the most excluded groups of American society that, through political action, the populists promised to restore the country to its path, one defined by God.

Still in the US, according to Yates (2007), another form of religious populism emerged. Despite its origins in the 17th century, the American Puritan jeremiad, inspired by the Book of Jeremiah, one of the works of the Old Testament, arose with new power in the 1970s and 1980s, with the support of Protestant evangelicalism, fundamentalist groups and other conservative Protestant sects which sought to reclaim the US for Christ, bringing Christ back into the (public) political arena. The spread of this movement facilitated the growth of "a hothouse of religious institutions" (Yates 2007: 129) that came to influence public life at the ministerial, policy and media levels, with the construction of a myriad of global media empires. From the 1990s onwards, the institutionalization of the Jeremiah rhetorical tradition was essential in mobilizing believers for public action. The organizations and leaders that sprang from this renewed tradition became very publicly visible, but "nowhere did this newfound prominence seem more tangible than in politics" (Yates 2007: 129).

The de-privatization of religious populism, i.e., the politicization of its discourse, has had, in the West, an expansion into allegedly secular contemporary territories. In the 1990s and 2000s, in Europe some paradigmatic cases emerged, as for example the Polish case.

Religious populism seems to have emerged in Poland after the end of the Cold War, in the context of the conversion of the Catholic Church into a national church promoting the emergence of a civil society against an authoritarian Polish state (Casanova 1994: 92ff). According to Zúquete (2017: 447), this was mainly due to the media activity of the Catholic priest Tadeusz Rydzyk and the diffusion of a certain version of Polish Catholicism as an

ideology of resistance. As in the case of the USA, here too the world is divided between believers (good but excluded) and their infernal enemies who had infiltrated and taken over the country's institutions. However, this discourse had already been active since the late 1970s, with the appointment of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope (1978) and his first pilgrimage to Poland (1979) which served as a catalyst for the creation of the Solidarność movement and a series of political and social changes.

Another classic example in Europe is Greece. The adoption of a populist discourse by the Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church, i.e., the politicization of religious discourse in the country was "linked to the defense of Greek national identity – rooted in Hellenism and Orthodoxy – against the forces of evil and the enemies of «God's blessed people»" (Zúquete 2017: 447). The role of religion in Greek populism, then, is not about anti-system feelings. Rather, it seems to derive from the way in which the Orthodox Church has managed to offer Greeks a "sense of unique identity or even a «sacred people»" (DeHanas & Shterin 2018: 181). Moreover, it promoted an increasing centrality of the Church throughout the 1990s and a popular response to several public initiatives (Stavrakakis 2002: 36).

More recently, there has been a dissemination of such phenomena, but more in the sense of a rapprochement of politics and religion than of a real politicization of religious discourse. For example, religion and populism intersect in the European narrative on immigration, in countries such as Austria, Germany or Switzerland; in the UK, where Christianity influenced the outcome of the referendum on *Brexit*; in Turkey or North Macedonia, where religion has been politicized in terms of public discourse, public policies institutionalizing politico-religious alliances – i.e., politics monopolizes most religious issues *in name of the people*. In France, Roy (2016) shows how the National Front instrumentalizes religion for the development and promotion of its political proposals. How it uses Christianity as an identity marker that allows a distinction between good (us) and evil (them). In this context, Mabille (2019) further explains how Pope Francis, by his assertive criticism of the Roman Curia and clericalism, is close to these same populist traits, whether they are understood politically on the left or on the right.

Some of these examples show how, between the late 20th and early 21st centuries, several populist movements with a politico-religious bias began to invoke their link to Europe's Christian identity as a way of distinguishing between the good (the natives, the Christian people) and the evil (the others, non-natives, and non-Christians, against the backdrop of Muslim growth on the continent).

The populism of radical Islam, the story of *jihad*, is also a narrative with a nativist bias. It is the story of the *umma*, the Islamic supernation that was desecrated by *jahiliyya*, i.e., the paganism of pre-Islamic Arabia attributed to modern secular nation-states, Western global culture, and the elites who ruled both. It is also the narrative of the duty of the faithful of battling *kufr*, unbelief, and restore a certain sacred territoriality for believers (Yates 2007: 129-130). Religious populism invokes this narrative about the struggle of the oppressed people, making use of it to justify the sacredness of its actions. The case

of Islam is, for Payne (2008: 31 *apud* **Zúquete** 2017: 449), an "extreme example of the politicization of traditional religion".

The mid-20ᵗʰ century was, however, a "long period of quietism" in Islam (Yates 2007: 130). From the 1970s onwards, radical Islamic reached a critical mass to solidify itself in religious and associational networks or brotherhoods designed to reassert Islamic principles in the public and political life of secular post-colonial Middle Eastern countries. The 1979 Iranian Revolution and the politicization of Shiism were the "starting point" of Islamic religious populism (Zúquete 2017: 449). Nevertheless, the establishment of a Muslim state in Iran was symbolic, as "the crowning event came a decade later with the liberation of Afghanistan from the Soviets" (Yates 2007: 130). Subsequently, jihad entered the 1990s with renewed vigor.

If, in a first phase, their focus was centered on the political liberation of Muslim societies from the injustices and moral corruption of secular colonial and post-colonial governments; in a second phase, global jihad emerged as a more dispersed and isolated movement uniting the faithful (defenders of good) around the idea of combat against infidel Western powers (which represented the corrupt and apostate governments previously installed in the Middle East), especially the US. It is within this spectrum that political Islam fits into a contemporary religious populism often personified in violence and terrorist attacks, such as the infamous attacks on the World Trade Center in New York (US) in 1993 and 2001, the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 or the US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) in 1998.

The religious interpretation of political events, together with ideas of messianism and the return of the Hidden Imam, persisted in the region, promoting a return to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. This corresponded to the transformation of jihadism into a subtype of religious populism. In sum, in today's Muslim societies, the new Islamic populism and the mobilization of the *umma* are confined to the borders of the nation-state. This may mean the legitimation of a state based on Islamic law, but it also allows the faithful to wage their struggle against *kufr* within contemporary democratic regimes.

DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOUS POPULISM: MODERNOPHOBIA AND ISLAMOPHOBIA
Modernophobia
One of the most famous definitions of modernization was presented by Giddens (1991). It refers to the advent of modes of organization of social life which emerged in Europe around the 17ᵗʰ century and which, from then on, became global in their influence.

Its features are illustrated in an extensive list of historical vicissitudes typical of European societies which began in the 13ᵗʰ century. For centuries Western post-Enlightenment intellectuals have catalogued and linked these specific features and their trends. They created a taxonomy of modernity that established itself as one of the main products of European social thought in the 18ᵗʰ and 19ᵗʰ centuries.

A systematic vision of historical progress emerges suggesting an unilinear view of history. Modernization comes to be understood as a historical-philosophical theory about the general future of all peoples, regardless of their regional context or cultural idiosyncrasies. In other words, the separation of the concept of modernity from its historical European origins transformed it into a neutral and universal spatiotemporal category of social development, inspired by European history – the pattern for the future of humanity. This idea of modernization becomes dominant in the second half of the 20th century, in the post-World War II period, when attempts are made to understand in a more scientific and systematic way the changes that have occurred in the post-colonial world. In the West, contemporary historical events are believed to converge towards a univocal, interdependent, and global model of development that opposes traditional societies (Moniz 2018: 125ff).

Thus, as Berger (2014) suggests, modernization develops around a secular discourse that assumes a dominant position in society and in peoples' minds. It essentially embodies the emergence of an *immanent secular frame* (Taylor 2007) that helps people interpret the world. The assumptions and practices sponsored by the political arm of modernization, secularism, become self-evident and are generally accepted as a natural feature of societies. These elements of secular normalization are the pretext for a socio-political and legal practice that promotes and hegemonizes cultures of secularity. This results in a marginalization of religion, since to achieve a social and/or political consensus agreements are mainly developed along secular lines.

The deepening of secular hegemonies relativizes religious beliefs, undermining the unquestionability of their plausibility structures. Believers develop an awareness (whether false or not) that they are the cognitive minority. Chaplin (2008) says that this is the result of an excessively secular culture that puts people and religious principles in a difficult position, *swimming upstream*, when trying to engage in public sphere.

The perceived primacy of political, rational, and secular authority, of a public sphere that lives mainly by immanent references, or of believers as a cognitive minority leads, according to Berger (2014: 15), to a fundamentalism that "balkanizes a society, leading either to ongoing conflict or to totalitarian coercion". In effect, as some authors mention (Yates 2007; Juergensmeyer 2017) global modernity has transformed religious beliefs and practices, particularly through the emergence of a publicly active religious populism that advocates an absolute transcendent truth. From Muslim jihadi militants, Jewish anti-Arab activists, or members of Christian militia, they all see the world as subjugated to a secular mindset that wants to destroy their fragile religious cultures. The main argument is that the secular state, *the enemy*, wants to systematize its power as if *etsi Deus non daretur*.

The politicization of religion and, consequently, the de-privatization of religious populism develop concomitantly with the emergence of an awareness of the limits of modern secularism, especially its scientific and positivist aspects, which do not offer meaning to human existence nor lead to the integral progress of individuals. This crisis of meaning arises because the processes of social, economic, and cultural modernization have

broken with the sources of identity and systems of authority that have existed for a long time. Religion thus resurfaces with seductive answers for people in search of identity and communities of meaning in the face of the failure of modernity. Religious communities appear as a fundamental resource for existential legitimization within a social dynamic of doubt and anomie.

> "(…) [S]ecularism is the problem. By creating societies that are barren of any form of religious culture they deny religious people the expressions of what is for them an essential part of their identities. (…) This explains the phenomenon of fundamentalism, a movement that developed in Protestant Christianity in the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century and has become a general label to demarcate any kind of antimodernist religious conservativism around the world. (Juergensmeyer 2017: 327-328).

Consequently, the forms of religious populism which arise have a strongly conservative and fundamentalist bias. In other words, the current dominant forms of religious populism represent a hardening of religious orthodoxies as a reaction to the disruption, displacement, and disenchantment caused by the processes of modernity in religion.

Fundamentalism is, therefore, an expression of and a reaction to secular modernity. On the one hand, it is a reaction to modernity, a defensive opposition, normally associated with logics of cultural and/or national defense, against the individualization and privatization of religion. On the other hand, fundamentalism is a modern-day phenomenon, a direct consequence of a modernity which marginalizes the religious. Fundamentalism is, therefore, a response to secular modernity. It is a reaction to modernity, a defensive opposition, generally associated with logics of cultural and/or national defense, against the individualization and privatization of religion. But it is a modern-day phenomenon, a direct consequence of a modernity which marginalizes religion.

The example of the radicalization of religious orthodoxies (Muslim, Christian or other), their militancy and fundamentalism, show how religious populism is both a product and an agent of modernization. Religious populism, especially contemporary populism, is a reaction against a global enemy, *unbelief*, but more than that, it is a self-reflexive religious orthodoxy in confrontation with a global secularizing modernity.

For instance, in the case of Islam, we have the example of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and its powerful propaganda activities typical of *modernophobia*:

> "The religious narrative (...) aims at establishing a divine authority and legitimacy for violent struggle «to defend Islam against the crusader West» (...) In reality there are only two religions. There is the religion of Allah, which is Islam, and then the religion of anything else, which is kufr" (Pellerin 2016: 12).

In the case of Christianity, in the context of the Russian-Ukranian war, we have for example a statement of Kiril, the Patriarch of Russian Orthodox Church, where we find a similar type of *modernophobia* that opposes *progressive western values* to God's law:

> "We have entered into a struggle that has not a physical, but a metaphysical significance. (…) [I]n Donbas there is a rejection, a fundamental rejection of the so-called values that are offered today by those who claim world power (…). Pride parades are designed to demonstrate that sin is one variation of human behaviour. That's why in order to join the club of those countries, you have to have a gay pride parade. (…) If humanity accepts that sin is not a violation of God's law, if humanity accepts that sin is a variation of human behavior, the human civilization will end there" (NDTV 2022).

The emergence of religious populism as a reaction against modernity, *modernophobia*, is essentially a reaction of religious movements to the imposition of a unipolar global system dominated by the West and claiming secularism as the moral compass of politics – here understood in the etymological Greek sense (politiká) which is related to the management of public affairs. It is the allegory of what Barber (1995) called *Jihad vs. McWorld*, describing the conflict between global (secular) modernity – imperialist and monocultural – and territorial (religious) nativism – as a cultural reaction or defense.

Islamophobia

Islamophobia, as an aversion to the religion of Islam or Muslims in general, is another subtype of religious populism which, according to several authors (Mudde 2007; Apahideanu 2014; Brubaker 2016), emerged mainly in the West after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the expansion of globalization and its subsequent international migration phenomena, and the September 11 attacks and international coordination in the fight against terrorism. Thereafter, as Mudde (2007: 84) explains, Islamophobia "took center stage" in the political discourse of the "Western world" causing an increase in Islamophobic reaction. With these developments, Huntington's (1996) prophecy of a *clash of civilizations* begins, as the West comes to understand itself at odds with a Muslim imperialist world.

However, the number of Muslims, for example, in Europe, while growing, remains relatively marginal, still representing less than 5% of the total European population (Pew Reserarch Center, 2017). The major transformation towards Islamophobia was fundamentally discursive rather than demographic – there was a shift in the identification and analysis framework. In the post-Cold War era European immigrants and their descendants were transformed into Muslims. In other words:

> "Populations that had previously been identified and labeled using a variety of categories – as Moroccans, North Africans, guest-workers, immigrants, foreigners,

or (…) as blacks – have been increasingly identified and labeled as Muslims" (Brubacker, 2016).

This shift was partly a reaction to the arrival of immigrant populations who identified themselves as Muslims. Nevertheless, it was essentially due to a growing regional, European, and civilizational preoccupation with Islam than to major social demands from European Muslims. It was precisely this civilizational concern of the Judeo-Christian, but mostly Christian, European matrix with Muslims that became particularly prominent in European religious populism, namely that linked to a certain right-wing populist discourse. The notion concerning the protection "liberal and Western values against Islam" has become the new "master frame" for religiously motivated populism (Brubacker, 2016).

In this context, populism in Europe developed a new religious/Christian dimension of religious discourse and practice that comes under an ideological umbrella called "nativism" by Mudde (2007: 18ff). To some extent, this subtype of religious populism – Islamophobia – prescribes, on the one hand, that every country should be inhabited mostly, if not exclusively, by members of the native group; and, on the other hand, that non-native elements, such as people and ideas, are a fundamental threat to the idealized homogeneity of the native group. To create a native identity, it is necessary to contrast it with those considered non-natives. As Apahideanu explains, a "new enemy" that threatens the religious identity of the unity between state and people has been "rapidly, integrally, and definitively identified as the Islam." In a word, "a new form of religious populism gained hegemony in modern Western Europe: Islamophobic populism" (Apahideanu 2014: 85).

Thus, this new form of religious populism implicitly or explicitly refers to a Christian collectivity (we, the *ingroup*) that suffers an invasion by Muslims (the *outgroup*) (Mudde 2017: 63-64). Muslims are characterized holistically (Islamism) and antagonistically (e.g., violent and backward). Regarding the cultural dimension, this religious populism prescribes some restrictions on the religious rights of Muslims (from banning the building of minarets to prohibiting certain religious habits) while advocating the restoration and preservation of Christian roots. The characteristics of the outgroup, as a representation of the enemy, are then very clearly and explicitly defined, while those of the ingroup, the European Christians, remain vague and abstract (Mudde 2017: 64).

This type of Christianity, which Brubaker (2016) calls "reactive", presents itself ironically linked to movements such as liberalism and secularism that centuries ago made it fight against modernity and for its survival. Previously understood as antithetical to liberalism, secularism and modernity, Christianity (more specifically, Christianist secularism[1]) is progressively understood as its cultural matrix, but also as the moral compass

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1   In the same way that Muslims' religiosity emerges from the matrix of Islam, Brubaker (2017: 213) says that secularism has come to be understood as emerging from the matrix of Christianity. According to the author, as Europe becomes more secular, the more it comes to be represented as being (Judeo-)Christian, in opposition to Islam. That is, once Islam is established as antagonistic to liberalism, secularism, and modernity, Christianist secularism becomes the civili-

for a myriad of policies regarding human rights, tolerance, gender equality, and others. This transformation of the political meaning of Christianity was made possible by the growing significance of the comparative civilizational framework to which Christianity is opposed: Islam. The distinctions between Christianity and Islam are understood, for Islamophobic religious populists, in a framework of normative oppositions: between liberal and illiberal, individualist and collectivist, democratic and authoritarian, modern and retrograde, and secular and religious, respectively (DeHanas & Shterin 2018: 178).

This kind of religious populism perceives religion primarily in cultural and civilizational terms, in antithetical opposition to Islam. Religion is first and foremost an identity marker that allows the distinction between the good and the evil. The instrumentalization of religion by populists, in the West, essentially serves to differentiate the nation or people from others who threaten them, i.e., Muslim immigrants. As Roy writes, this religious populism is "Christian to the extent as it is anti-Muslim." Moreover, Christianity as a national identity is such a "superficial" cultural layer that it becomes easily "hijackable" by populists (Roy 2016: 186). In essence, Christian identity has the dual purpose of building nostalgia for a glorious national past and of transforming Islam into an intrinsically non-native culture. As happened to Jews in Europe, especially during World War II, "Islamophobia has become their contemporary counterpart" (Mudde 2007: 84).

In short, it can be said that this type of populism quickly took on a religious dimension, becoming almost exclusively Islamophobic. According to Apahideanu (2014: 94), this Islamophobia constitutes a true religious populism by all employable criteria:

> "[I]t is descriptively collectivist, normatively antagonistic, explicatively oriented against political elites and liberal intellectuals and prescriptively advocates an ousting of the political leadership by duly servants of the religiously defined people's will. Furthermore, it is constitutively anti-modernist, organizationally fluid and exploits the passions and emotions of its adherents."

This type of Islamophobic religious populism, initially confined to a few marginal and electorally irrelevant political leaders and parties, seems to have entered the mainstream of European political systems and social practices[2]. Not only have these populists been getting higher votes in national or European elections, but they have also been taking a predominant (religious) position in political discourse that has become almost entirely Islamophobic (Mudde 2007: 84ff).

Religion, in the very field of modernity and secularism, thus seems to follow the evolution of modernization in a trend of increasing de-privatization rather than privatization.

zational matrix of Western societies.

2   According to the report on Islamophobia in Europe, these cases have worsened in 2020, with its institutionalization, for example, in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Poland, or United Kingdom (Kazanci 2021).

As Casanova (1994: 234) wrote almost three decades ago, it would be "profoundly ironic" if, after predictions about its extinction in modern societies, religion ended up casually helping to save modernity itself.

CONCLUSION

A pertinent and contemporary approach to the phenomenon of populism must consider the subtype of religious populism. As seen above, this type of populism is not translated by the discourse of populist leaders when they try to manipulate believers in favor of their proposals. On the contrary, it is a type of leadership which exists within the religious structures themselves and which reveals distinctive traits identical to those of political populisms, both in the left and right-wing political spectrum.

With the de-privatization of religion and, subsequently, of religious populism, it has become possible to identify two subtypes of religious populism. The first, *modernophobia*, is associated with the (negative) reaction to the processes of modernity, namely secularism; the second, *Islamophobia*, is characterized by the reaction to the geographical expansion of Islam provoking the return of populist-religious discourses and practices.

Despite their differences, these two subtypes of religious populism rely on several common elements (Brissos-Lino 2021: 31-44). First, a religious leadership based on personal charisma where the populist leader affirms his position through his image as well as by his narrative and/or speech structure. Second, in a moralistic and exclusionary discourse that denies or ignores pluralism and praises the moral superiority of its own followers. Third, in a nativist reaction against globalization, with a focus on nationalism and cultural defense. Finally, in the promotion of insecurity, with the establishment of an *enemy* that helps forge a sense of belonging and common identity.

In sum, this paper fundamentally intends to contribute to the establishment of a theoretical and analytical framework for the analysis of the phenomenon of religious populism. On the one hand, it contextualizes the phenomenon and gives it current and real contours; on the other hand, it categorizes some of its analytical dimensions, offering the tools to deepen knowledge about religious populism – to analyze it in this and other regional contexts, examine its discursive tools, and identify and explore new grid analysis, such as new sub-types of religious populism. This article is therefore a further step towards understanding the contemporary phenomenon of religious populism and the complexities of its relationship with political populism, while at the same time allowing lines of investigation to be launched for all those interested in studying this phenomenon, both in the West and beyond.

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